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This does not mean that the A TCA has no conceivable benefits. It is imaginable that it could
deter human rights abuses in existing regimes. But this argument overlooks the exceptional
nature of regime transition. Even in purely domestic law
, we do not relentlessly enforce the law
when it interferes with pragmatic comproniises to enduring political problems. Our own trans-
itions-think of the Civil War-have usually involved pardons and amnesty. In any event
American citizens made the decision; they did not have to worry about the British hearing
lawsuits brought by former slaves against former slaveholders. There is real value in allowing
citizens of a country to determine their own response to the past. The A TCA
, as recently inter-
preted by the federal courts, is a lamentable example of American unilateralismand insensi-
tivity to the needs and local conditions of the foreign countries in which we intervene.
None of what I have said is an argument that the United States should take no. 
human rights abuses in countries that have undergone a transition to democracy. My claim is
only that the Alien Tort Claims Act is not a good tool for helping these countries.2 There aremany better ways. 
Transitional governments face numerous problems. Their main political problem is main-
taining and enhancing public support for democratic institutions. The old guard must be either
suppressed or conciliated; the general public must be persuaded that democracy is preferable
to the old system. Police, soldiers , and-bureaucrats must be retrained. In the former communist
countries, inefficient state enterprises must be liquidated. Courts must be expanded and profes-
sionalized. All this takes money and expertise; the major democracies can supply both
, as well
as moral and political support, including, if necessary, military assistance if the old guard
attempts a coup, as happened in the Philippines.
One of the benefits of this approach is that if this form of help works
, as it often appears to
at some point after institutions have stabilized, the state may be able to revisit the past. Once
the general public enjoys the benefits of market democracy, political support for the old guard
will decline and efforts to address human rights abuses are less likely to lead to political in-
stability. To some extent, this has happened in countries like Argentina and Chile.
REMARKS BY CRAIG SCOTT
My comments are intended to approach the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain case at a somewhat
abstract level, as may befit my status as 
world of the ATCA. I argue that lawsuits in the domestic courts of the United States and other
states that use the private-law category of tort to seek legal justice for public international law 
human rights violations will continue to produce both profound political conflict and unsatis-
factory juridical analysis as long as quite stark dichotomies between "international law" and
national law " on the one hand, and "public law and ' 'private law " on the other, continue to
structure both legal theory and legal doctrine-and
, perhaps most important, the practical legal
imagination. 1
2 For an argument that courts enforcing the ATCA 
Just" but not otherwise
see Jennifer Llewellyn, Just Amnesty and Private International Law in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PER- 
SPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL TORT 
to think that courts, rather than the executive branch, should milke this judgment.
. Associate Dean (Research and Graduate Studies), Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto.
I TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL TORT 
(Crail!: Scott ed. 2001), See eSDeciaIIv Crail!: Scott. Translatin!! Torture into Tran~national Tort: r.onr.p.ntunl n;vidp..
the argumentative and the existential as features of the judicial landscape 
called a "rhetorical responsibility"2 -in this context, an inescapable (albeit unattainable ) duty
to persuade multiple audiences that they should be convinced by that judge s interpretations
of the content of international human rights law, of the nature and extent of violations
, " 
her choice to provide remedial vindication of' 'public international law" human-rights wrongs
through the vehicle of domestic tort law.
Such responsibility inevitably involves occasional (and maybe not-so-occasional) normative
leaps of faith that, in my view, can be grounded in little more than a combir!.ation of two alle-
giances. There is first of all the substantive commitment to a transnational common project of
pursuing "fundamental" human rights values through law, inchlding ' reception ' of international
human rights rules and principles through what amount to acts of transformation by state judges
in the form of common-law incorporations and .both statutory and constitutlonalinterpreta-
tions. There is secondly an ethos of transnational dialogue among courts in the world with
respect to this common project, not only through the much-vaunted 
parative constitutional dialogue but also through a core mechanism of private international law
namely the not-infrequent necessity for judgments in one state to be given effect only when
formally recognized by judges in another state as having been properly rendered, jurisdiction-
ally, procedurally, or substantively.
In some kind of matrix created by these two kinds of normative interplay-the reception 
international law by domestic courts and the subsequent recognition by foreign courts of the
judgments arising from such reception-I believe we may eventually arrive at a kind of trans-
nationalization of our understanding of tort-based liability for infringements of human rights
norms initially generated by public international law.
This, then, is the project in all its abstractness. In what follows, I seek to make it concrete:
Though given the limits of space, I will likely only succeed in getting to the point of preparing
to mix powder with water. 
In the amicus brief in Sosa submitted by the Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal
History can be found a marvelous nugget of a quotation, which resonates with irony. The
amicus writers first comment that in 1789, when the predecessor oftoday s A TCA was enacted
The' law of nations also appli~d as common law in ,,3 They then go on to 
this claim by invoking Blackstone s Commentaries, published in 1769: "Blackstone reported
for example, that ' in mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange and the like. . . the law
merchant, which is a branch of the law of nations, is regularly and constantly adhered to . . . . The
same was true in America. ,,4
From this short passage from Blackstone, penned almost 250 years ago, and the follow-on
observations in the amicus brief, we catch a glimpse of a veritable lost world when one com-
pares the commonplace assumptions of the late eighteenth century to the contemporary terms
of debate and general discourse surrounding both the A TCA and the Sosa case. Two points in
particular should be noted.
2 Craig Scott DiversePersuasion(s): From Rhetoric to Representation (and BackAgain to Rhetoric) in International
Human Rights Interpretation, in HUMANRIGHTS: THEINTERNATIONALLEGALCONTEXT , forthcoming).
3 Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, filed
in the Supreme Court of the United States in Case No. 03-339 Jose Francisco Sosa v, Humberto Alvarez-Machain
et aI. , at 12 (Feb. 27 , 2004).
Id. quoting 4 WILLIAM 
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First, note the ease with which the "law of nations" is felt by Blackstone to include what in
current times is almost universally cited as the best example of a body of transnational law
blending the national and the international, as well as private law and public regulation (in-
cluding public regulation by abstention and by acquiescence), namely lex mercatoria. As we
debate what the A TCA means now partly in light of what it meant in 1789, we get a sense from
Blackstone of how the framework of law beyond a single state in 1789 involved a far more
hybrid and pluralistic body oflaw than is currently the case in mainstream international legal
thought.
Second, the passage reveals how the A TCA was grafted onto a seamless 
the unwritten "law of nations" and the "common law " including the common law as it applied
in civil (private ) law relationships, and at the center of which was of course the judge as not just
chief articulator but chief forger of law.
The irony I noted is that in some respects we were in 1789 exactly 
heading in 2004. In what sense? In the sense that, in the interpretive and political debates about
the A TCA, judicial agency is almost the reality that dare not speak its name. Some, if not most
readers will raise their eyebrows at this observation. After all, they may say, both the petitioner
Sosa and the supporting U.S. government are taking the tack of arguing for an interpretive
resultby claiming that the body of interpretation is the result of judicial 
a form of judicial agency-and, not without inconsistency, asking the u.s. Supreme Court to
engage ill one gigantic paroxysm of judicial agency to overturn twenty-five years of gradual
interpretive consensus among lower courts.
Granted, but my point is that what amounts to discussion of judicial agency seems to be
spinning hopelessly on the tired old axis of judicial activism versus judicial restraint, as framed
by the largely unhelpful metaphor of the separation (as contrasted to "balance" or, better
interaction ) of powers. Not enough of the debate seems to consciously address the following
question: Exactly what kind of body oflaw is at stake here and just what kind of role for judges
is appropriate for that kind of body of law?
Allow me to -illustrate with one important example. In the field of torture, Article 14 of the
United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT) is an important touchstone for interpreting
both common-law causes of action in a country like Canada and statutory private law in an
A TCA (assuming there is a cause of action in ATCA) or in, say, the delict provisions of a civil-
law code. Article 14 reads in part: 
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including
the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. . . .
Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to compensa-
tion which may exist under nationallaw.
Even in the amicus brief of the European Commission, the Sosa brief that in my view is the
most freshly and carefully reasoned (especially in terms of bringing public international law
. principles to bear on the analysis of states ' private~ law 
sideration only of the obligatory , found in Article 14(1), with a
statement that it is unsettled ("there is disagreement") whether the Convention requires states
to exerCise universal jurisdiction (to provide a right to 
torture may be committed) or, rather
, "
simply jurisdiction over torture committed on their
have judges forging common-law tort claims with respect to acts oftorture occurring abroad.
Indeed, when one looks at the nature of the torture norm and the quasi-universalist structure of
criminal-law cooperation in CAT, one can be forgiven for seeing Article 14(2) as not just
permitting but encouraging states to enter that permissive normative'space and help forge , by
dint of example and the combination of reception and recognition I mentioned, the very con-
sensus the European Commission notes does not yet exist.
Elsewhere in its brief, while the Commission does several times emphasize that interna-
tional norms evolve and that domestic courts must take such evolution into account, it does not
directly engage with the role of domestic judges as active participants of that evolutionary
process, as a facilitative reading of Article 14(2) might suggest, as opposed to adopting an
(implicitly) dualistic perspective that sees domestic judges primarily as recipients 
, national law only once it has evolved "out there.
However, I would be remiss if! were to end by making it seem the European Commission
brief deserves to be singled out for criticism by example. In fact, of all the amicus briefs, it is
the only one that consistently discusses the legal issues at stake in Sos in termS that transcend
the compartmentalization of private international law (with its attention to civil jurisdiction)
and public international law (with its preoccupation with criminal-law or statutory economic-
regulation jurisdiction). It is also the only brief to squarely address the similarities and differ-
ences between the 
law) in a way that seems implicitly designed to help inform the forging of a new body of lawby national judges. 
Perhaps most exciting in the European Commission s brief is an insightful' and. a fairly
extended discussion of the mutually informative doctrines of exhaustion of local remedies
originating in public international law and private international law doctrines of jurisdictional
abstention, such asforum non conveniens. Although the connection between the two may be
no more than what would be expected by those 
public international law and private international law as cut from the same cloth, I prefer to see
this as the implicit beginning of transatlantic awareness that the future of translating torture into
tort ultimately lies in transnationallaw.
7 In this respect
, I find it significant that the sources of the principles the Commission suggests domestic judges
draw upon to forge an appropriate jurisdictional discourse around international human rights torts include not 'only
public international law and (comparative) private intemationallaw but also the statutory recognition by the U.
Congress of exhaustion- of-local-remedies criteria in ATCA' s cousin, the Torture Victim Protection Act. 
